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Abstract The benefits of dual apprenticeship programs are usually discussed in the
context of reducing structural unemployment rates, especially among the young.
Related to this, the long-run benefits of dual apprenticeship programs are exten-
sively analyzed in the literature. However, empirical evidence regarding the short-run
effects of the business cycle on the number of apprenticeships is scarce. In this paper,
we use panel-data at the German federal states level ranging from 1999 through 2012
to analyze the effects of the business cycle on the number of new apprenticeship
contracts. Using different sample periods and model specifications, we do not find
a robust and significant effect of the business cycle on apprenticeships. Hence, the
apprenticeship system seems to dampen the volatility of youth unemployment.
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Introduction
While the economic literature extensively investigates the role of skill acquisition
in the context of long-run economic growth, the short-run relation between the
business cycle and skill-acquisition is much less understood (see e.g. Me´ndez and
Sepu´lveda 2012). In this paper, we focus on one particular way of skill acquisi-
tion, namely the dual-apprenticeship system, which is a market-driven form at the
upper-secondary school level. In this system apprentices have a contract with a
firm and receive training both at school and at the firm. Therefore, the number of
new apprenticeship contracts depends on the number of school graduates that are
looking for an apprenticeship and the number of apprenticeship contracts offered
by firms. This form of education is mainly present in countries from Continen-
tal and Northern Europe such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands,
Denmark and Sweden. The influence of the business cycle on the number of
apprenticeship programs is a research question of high policy relevance for coun-
tries where these programs play an important role. In countries like Germany,
Austria or Switzerland, at least half of primary and secondary school graduates
start an apprenticeship program. Thus, a large part of the young people in educa-
tion can potentially be affected by movements in output growth and the level of
unemployment.
Our research is also of interest for countries, where dual-apprenticeships are less
common. For example, dual-apprenticeship systems are nearly absent in Southern
European countries as well as in the UK and Ireland. Given that many of these
countries are struggling with high unemployment rates especially among the young,
the EU Commission (see e.g. European Commission 2012) advocates the implemen-
tation of apprenticeship programs in these countries, based among others on the idea
that such programs help lower structural and cyclical unemployment among young
people.
Since firms are naturally exposed to the business cycle, the number of apprentice-
ship contracts they offer may depend on the economic stance. However, the sign of
the relation is far from clear. It will be positive if firms reduce the number of appren-
ticeship contracts along with overall employment in a recession. Moreover, labor
contract regulation is normally stricter than for usual employees. A firm can only
terminate a training contract unilaterally for economic reasons. As a consequence,
firms might be reluctant to hire an apprentice if the business or economic stance is
bad or if business expectations are poor. On the other hand, the relation between the
business cycle and the number of apprenticeship contracts could also be negative,
because apprentices constitute a cheap low-skilled labor input for firms that might
substitute for other unskilled workers in a recession. In addition, hiring and training
an apprentice can be seen as an investment by the firm. For example, firms might
expect that the economy will have recovered by the time the apprenticeship ends. In
addition, apprentices may carry out parts of skilled as well as unskilled work, which
gives the firm flexibility in assigning tasks to apprentices. Therefore, it is conceivable
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that output volatility can show either a positive or a negative effect on the number of
apprenticeship contracts.
The literature review by Brunello (2009) shows that the number of offered appren-
ticeship contracts is usually lower during a recession. This implies that the decision
on the number of offered apprenticeship contracts is not qualitatively different
from the general recruitment strategy of firms (see e.g. Lindley 1975; Brunello and
Medio 2001). Several papers investigating different countries provide empirical evi-
dence that an economic downturn or periods of high unemployment lead to a lower
number of offered apprenticeship positions. Using firm-level data for the period from
1993 to 2003, Dietrich and Gerner (2007) find a significant relation between short-
term business expectations and offered apprenticeship contracts. An increase in the
expected business volume by one percent raises the number of apprenticeship con-
tracts by 0.35 percent. For Norway, Askilden and Nilsen (2005) show that the number
of apprenticeship contracts decreases with employment. Westergaard-Nielsen and
Rasmussen (1999) find that firms’ demand for apprentices is positively related to the
demand for skilled labor in Denmark. For Switzerland, Schweri and Mu¨ller (2008)
and Mu¨hlemann et al. (2009) find a small positive effect of GDP growth on the firms’
propensity to train and on the apprenticeship ratio in Switzerland. However, busi-
ness cycle effects on apprenticeship training tend to be weaker than on overall labor
demand.
Our aim is to empirically investigate the sign of the average effect of the busi-
ness cycle on apprenticeship contracts for Germany. In our empirical analysis, we use
data on newly offered and concluded apprenticeship contracts at the level of the 16
German states from 1999 through 2012. The federalistic nature of the German edu-
cation system makes such an analysis reasonable, since demographic developments,
the industry structure and also business cycles can vary considerably across the states.
Based on the panel structure of our data, our findings show that the estimated effect
from income growth and unemployment on the number of apprenticeship contracts
is weak and hardly significant.
This paper is structured as follows. Section The German Apprenticeship System
outlines the characteristics of the German apprenticeship system and compares it
briefly to other countries. Section Data and Methodology describes the data set used
and the methodology for our estimations. The results of our estimations are presented
in Section Results. Finally, Section Conclusion contains the conclusion.
The German Apprenticeship System
In Germany, vocational training is attained by completing one of more than 300
programs of officially recognized occupations in order to gain all competence of
a skilled worker in that field. In general, around one half of school graduates
start vocational training each year (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung (BIBB) 2013a;
Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). There are three notable elements that make the
German dual-apprenticeship system special in an international context. One element
is the corporate organization of the system: the state, unions and employers jointly
decide on the principles of apprenticeship. Second, the education is dual, meaning
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that it consists of school-based and firm-based training elements. The third element is
the vocationalism of the system, i.e. the accumulation of occupation-specific knowl-
edge and skills. An apprenticeship system with these characteristics is described
as collectivistic, see e.g. Ebner and Nikolai (2010). Austria and Switzerland have
established similar systems as Germany.
The corporate organization is reflected in nationwide standardization of programs
concerning content and duration. Duration ranges from two to four years. The share
of firms fulfilling the requirements for dual-apprenticeship training is at a constant
level of about 59 % of German firms. The number of firms actively participating in
apprenticeship training was substantially lower in 2012 with a share of 31 % of all
firms, see e.g. Hartung (2012).
The duality of the concept is the core element of vocational formation in Germany.
Every dual apprenticeship is based on a private-law contract between the apprentice
and the training firm for the apprenticeship. The contract automatically terminates
with completion of the training. The apprentices receive a standardized salary that
varies between different professions and sectors. During the course of an appren-
ticeship, trainees switch between learning in vocational schools, which covers about
40 % of the total training time, and working periods in the firm. During in-firm
periods the trainees undergo practical training and gather firm-specific knowledge
(Biavaschi et al. 2012). All apprenticeships end with a final exam issued by a central
federal committee board.
A firm’s decision to employ apprentices depends on the benefits and costs of
training an apprentice. First, as trainees are skilled workers by the end of the appren-
ticeship, firms can meet their need of specialized personnel over a medium-term time
horizon. In other words, apprenticeship helps to satisfy firms’ demand for skilled
workers and thereby retains their competitiveness. Second, training costs are an
important factor as well. There are, apart from providing the vocational schooling, no
governmental subsidies for the training firms. Smaller firms face positive net costs
from training due to larger relative costs of providing workspace for apprentices.
Still, some firms face negative net costs, since apprentices’ wages are low compared
to regular wages. Therefore, trainees might be hired even if firms have no demand for
specialists (Niederalt 2004). Moreover, vocational training gives firms the opportu-
nity to screen possible future employees who additionally have gathered firm-specific
knowledge.
Trainees have incentives to participate in the German apprenticeship system since
it provides the chance to cross the “first barrier” in the labour market more easily.
Due to the concept of vocationalism, apprentices are fully qualified workers by the
end of their training. This is a key factor for a gradual transfer from school to employ-
ment and for long-run employment. According to Reinberg and Hummel (2005)
participating in vocational training considerably reduces the risk of unemployment.
Fedorets and Spitz-Oener (2011) show that human capital accumulated during voca-
tional training is even transferable between different occupations, so vocationalism
does not inhibit flexibility.
The German apprenticeship market is closely connected with the regular labor
market. About 66 % of successful apprentices stay in the same firm, in which
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they completed their apprenticeship. This can be seen as an indicator for a
smooth transition from education to regular employment (Hartung 2012). On
the other hand, young adults with poor school reports have severe problems
to enter the labor market, since training firms recruit by market criteria and
demand has regularly exceeded supply of apprenticeship contracts in recent years
(Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung (BIBB) 2013b).
Data and Methodology
Our methodology closely resembles the one in Mu¨hlemann et al. (2009) and uses
standard panel data methods to analyze the determinants of apprenticeship contracts
at the regional level. Using firm-level data might be interesting for the analysis of
sector spectific features. However, in this paper, we focus on the relation between
aggregate variables. The data we use consists of yearly information on offered
apprenticeship contracts offered from businesses between 1999 and 2012 from all 16
German federal states. Additionally, for each state, we consider two variables related
to the business cycle: the unemployment rate and the growth rate of regional real
income. In addition, we control for demographic effects by considering demographic
variables like the population of school leavers at age 16 and the number of first-year
students. Descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Figure 1 shows the log number of new apprenticeship contracts together with the
growth rate of real income for each federal state. The visual inspection of the data
reveals that real income growth rates showed no trend over the sample period. In
the west German states, growth rates of real income decreased sharply during the
economic crisis between 2007 and 2009. At the same time real income growth in
the east German states remained more or less stable, with the exception of Sachsen-
Anhalt, where the drop in the growth rate is small compared to the average decrease
in the west German states. The rate of unemployment together with the log number of
new apprenticeship contracts in each year for each federal state is displayed in Fig. 2.
From 1999 to 2006/07, unemployment rates remained on high levels and started to
decrease thereafter. In our estimations, we take these data characteristics into account
by analysing corresponding sub-samples and sub-groups.
Table 1 Description of the data
Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. Obs.
Appr. contracts 29647.53 29645.35 122109 4064 224
Income 1413.39 1408.22 5207.02 230.12 224
Income growth 0.41 2.25 6.34 -10.62 208
Unemployment 12.19 4.78 22.10 4.20 224
School graduates 58021.48 54779.17 223515 7029 224
First year students 24056.62 23152.23 120305 3060 224
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Fig. 1 Apprenticeship contracts and income growth in the German federal states
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Fig. 2 Apprenticeship contracts and unemployment in the German federal states
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A simple linear model that links the log-level of the number of apprenticeship
contracts ait to the growth rate of real income yi,t−1 and to the unemployment rate
uit is
ait = ci + θyi,t−1 + δuit + x′itβ + εit (1)
where i indexes the federal state, i = 1, 2, . . . , 16, and t indexes the year, t =
1, 2, . . . , 14. The variable ci accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among the fed-
eral states. It is constant over time and may be correlated with income growth. For
example, the ci ’s capture heterogeneity in the economic structures of the states. The
vector xit comprises demographic variables that might be correlated with the business
cycle and that have an impact on the number of apprenticeship contracts. Variation in
the error-term εit stems from changes in the educational framework in federal state i
in year t , which are not correlated with the business cycle and not autocorrelated (see
e.g. Wooldridge 2002).
To meet concerns about the timing of the variables, we use the previous year’s
growth rate of real income in our regressions. New apprenticeship contracts are
closed some time before the usual start of the training year on the first of August.
Therefore, we use the previous year’s growth rate of real income as an indicator for
the business cycle in the beginning of the following year when, presumably, firms
and apprentices form their decisions on new apprenticeship contracts.
In Eq. (1) the coefficient θ measures the ceteris paribus percentage change of
apprenticeship contracts that is due to an increase in income growth by one percent-
age point and δ measures the ceteris paribus effect of a one percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate. To obtain consistent estimates for θ and δ and to justify
standard statistical inference, the regressors in (1) have to be strictly exogenous given
the unobserved effect ci , meaning that once yi,t−1, uit , xit and ci are controlled
for, yi,s−1, uis and xis have no partial effects on ait for s = t . Strict exogeneity in
terms of the errors can be stated as
E(εit |yi1, . . . , yiT , ui1, . . . , uiT , xi1, . . . , xiT , ci) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , 16.
(2)
Since we allow for state specific effects to capture unobserved fixed effects, we
consider strong exogeneity a justifiable assumption in our model.
Results
Table 2 summarizes estimation results for different specifications of our empirical
model (1). While the specifications in columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 include only
business cycle variables, the regression presented in the last column is augmented
with demographic control variables. In the specifications, in which income growth
is included, its estimated coefficient varies between 0.7 and 1.2. Thus, an increase
in income growth by one percentage point would trigger an increase in the number
of new apprenticeship contracts by roughly one percent on average. However, as
indicated by the relatively large standard errors the income effect is not statistically
significant.
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Table 2 Estimated business cycle effects on the number of apprenticeship contracts, the dependent vari-
able is the number of apprenticeship contracts in federal state i in year t , ait . The model includes state
fixed effects. Sample period 1999-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 11.11∗∗∗ 11.09∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.08) (0.08) (1.34)
Income growth 1.11 1.16 0.72
(1.20) (1.18) (0.97)
Unemployment rate 0.005 0.006 −0.03∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.02)
Log number of school graduates 0.22∗
(0.11)
Log number of first year students −0.55∗∗∗
(0.16)
Observations 224 224 224 224
Groups 16 16 16 16
Observations per group 14 14 14 14
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
‘∗’ (‘∗∗’,‘∗ ∗ ∗’) indicates statistical significance at 10 % (5 %, 1 %)
An increase in the rate of unemployment significantly lowers the number of new
apprenticeship contracts in the specification where we control for the number of first
year students and the number of school graduates, see column (4). The estimated
elasticity of −0.03 is rather small, implying that the number of new apprenticeship
contracts in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, for example, would have been decreased by 16
on average in 2012 if the rate of unemployment would have been increased by one
percentage point in that year.
The estimated effect of income growth does not change substantially when the
demographic control variables are included in the regression, see Table 2 column
(4). The effect of the log number of school graduates is significant and shows the
expected positive sign. The estimated elasticities of the number of new apprentice-
ship contracts with respect to the number of school graduates in a given year roughly
correspond to the empirical observation that each year more than one third of school
graduates start a dual training programm on average. The relation between the log
number of first year students and new apprentices is negative and strongly signifi-
cant, thus reflecting substitution effects between university and firm level training.
Potential heterogeneity among the west and the east German states gives reason to
split the sample and to look for different effects in west and east Germany. More pre-
cisely, we allow for different effects of income growth and unemployment in the east
and west German states by including corresponding interaction terms in the regres-
sions. The specifications additionally include the logs of the two control variables,
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the number of school graduates and the number of first year students. Estimation
results for different sample periods are presented in the columns of Table 3. Esti-
mated income effects, given in rows two and three of Table 3, are not significant
except for the sample period 2007-2012 presented in the last column of Table 3,
where income growth has a positive effect on the number of new apprenticeship
contracts. While the estimated income effects are similar for the west and the east
German states there are some differences with respect to the rate of unemploy-
ment. In the west German states we find significantly negative, albeit small, effects
of unemployment on the number of new apprenticeship contracts in all subsamples.
In the east German states the rate of unemployment is not significant except for
2007-2012, where it has a negative effect on the number of new apprenticeship
contracts.
Taken together, the sub-sample results support our earlier impression that business
cycle effects on the number of new apprenticeship contracts are small in size and
that their statistical significance is rather weak. While we do not find any significant
effects of income growth during normal times for both east and west German states,
Table 3 Estimated business cycle effects on the number of apprenticeship contracts in east and west
Germany for different sample periods. The dependent variable is the number of apprenticeship contracts
in state i in year t , ait . The model includes state fixed effects
Variable 1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2012
Constant 16.37∗∗∗ 12.26∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗
(1.74) (2.85) (0.87)
Income growth, West 0.56 0.81 0.54∗
(0.93) (0.86) (0.31)
Income growth, East 1.09 2.07 1.16∗∗∗
(1.40) (2.31) (0.21)
Unemployment rate, West −0.04∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unemployment rate, East −0.02 −0.03 −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Log no. of school graduates 0.11 0.51∗∗ 0.06
(0.11) (0.22) (0.07)
Log no. of first year students −0.58∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.16) (0.20) (0.01)
Obs. 224 128 96
Groups 16 16 16
Obs. per group 14 8 6
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
‘∗’ (‘∗∗’,‘∗ ∗ ∗’) indicates statistical significance at 10 % (5 %, 1 %)
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changes in the rate of unemployment significantly lower the number of new appren-
ticeship contracts in the west German states but not in the east German states. In
normal times, the number of new apprenticeship contracts in the east German states
is not affected by business cycle fluctuations. In the west German states the number
of new apprenticeship contracts decreases with rising unemployment rates. Since the
beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, the number of new apprenticeship contracts
moves in the same direction as output growth in east and west Germany.
Conclusion
This paper has analysed the short-run reaction of apprenticeship programs offered
by businesses to business cycle variables. Panel-data have been used for the German
federal states ranging from 1999 to 2012 to show that the impact of business cycle
fluctuations on the number of new apprenticeship contracts is weak and hardly sig-
nificant on average. Hence, the apprenticeship system seems to have dampened the
volatility of youth unemployment in Germany. We also document the importance of
demographic variables in explaining the number of apprenticeship contracts.
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